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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY,

Case No. 870057

Petitioner,
vs.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH: BRIAN T. STEWART,
Chairman; JAMES M. BYRNE,
Commissioner; BRENT H. CAMERON,
Commissioner,

Argument Priority No. 9

Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH;
DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES, UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
BUSINESS REGULATION; COMMITTEE OF CONSUMER SERVICES;
EXCHANGE CARRIERS OF UTAH (FORMERLY UTAH
INDEPENDENT TELEPHONE ASSOCIATION);
SALT LAKE COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM; UTAH ISSUES;
CONTINENTAL TELEPHONE COMPANY OF THE WEST

The respondents named above respectfully submit this
response to the brief of petitioner The Mountain States
Telephone and Telegraph Company ("Mountain Bell" or "Bell").
The brief responds to the four points of Mountain
Bell's argument in the same order; an additional point (V)
raises an issue Bell did not address.

The sections of the

utilities statutes are referred to by citation of the section
number only; except as noted the references are to Utah Code
Annotated 1953 (1986 Repl. Vol. 6A). The record is cited
-R

.-

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT AND
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Jurisdiction is conferred by § 54-7-16•
In the proceedings below the Public Service Commission
promulgated a rule that (1) established a lowered (-lifeline-)
rate for low-income telephone customers, (2) imposed small
surcharges upon non-lifeline customers and upon long distance
services to make up the reduced revenues and administrative
costs of the participating telephone carriers, and (3) ordered
a pooling of the surcharges and a distribution among such
carriers.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether any judicial deference is to be accorded

the Commission's decision to pool the surcharges, where the
petitioning carrierfs challenge is that the pooling improperly
discriminates against petitioner's customers.
2.

Whether the Commission is authorized by statute

to fund the telephone lifeline program by pooling lifeline
surcharges on a joint or industry basis rather than funding it
on a company-specific basis.
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3.

Whether the pooling here ordered is a valid

exercise of the Commission's authority to classify customers
for ratemaking purposes.
4.

Whether the surcharge pooling is an unlawful tax.

5.

Whether a reversal of the Commission's surcharge

pooling decision would operate to set aside the Lifeline Rules
in their entirety.

CITATION OF DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
(Text of statutes in Addendum)
§ 54-3-1

§ 54-4-7

§ 54-3-4

§ 54-4-8

§ 54-3-8

§ 54-4-12

§ 54-4-1

§ 54-4-13(1)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Qf the C9S9

This is a petition by Mountain Bell for the Court's
review of that part of the Lifeline Rules requiring the
participating telephone carriers to pool the lifeline
surcharges.

The petition does not challenge any other element

of the rules.
B.

Course of proceedings and
fligpQgitiQn frelQw.

The Commission commenced these proceedings in June
1985 to consider adoption of a rule that would afford a lowered
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telephone rate to low income households (R 337). Numerous
parties (the Division of Public Utilities, the Committee of
Consumer Services, thirteen telephone corporations providing
local exchange service in Utah, a long-distance carrier (AT&T),
and two consumer organizations) appeared (R 1, 2).
The Commission first asked the parties to brief
several issues, including the issue whether it had authority to
order a "lifeline- service (R 349 et seq.).

It then received

sworn pre-filed testimony,1 and conducted several days of cross
examination hearings and a public witness session.

Thereafter,

all parties submitted a settlement stipulation (Exh. A to this
brief; R 620-8), which the Commission approved (R 636). The
Commission promulgated the Lifeline Rules to be effective
January 1, 1987 (R 630-635).

(The text is an Exhibit (A) to

Mountain Bell's brief).
Mountain Bell twice sought Commission rehearings,
limited to a challenge to the surcharge pooling element of the
rules, which the Commission denied.

This petition for review,

also limited to that one issue, followed.

1

The record certified to the Court does not include the
voluminous pre-filed testimony and exhibits, but does include
each witness's summary. Because the facts are stipulated,
respondents have not asked supplementation of the record.
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C.

Stfrtement pf the Facts

Part 1 of this statement supplements the Mountain Bell
statement with additional material, and part 2 corrects a basic
error in the Bell statement.

1.

Facts and background.

The Commission described the legal background of these
proceedings as a part of its explanatory Report And Order of
December 17, 1986 (Exhibit B; R 643-651):

in April 1985 a

memorandum of the Division of Public Utilities (R 331-336)
called the Commissions attention to an order of the Federal
Communications Commission that imposed upon all telephone
customers a local "end-user" charge (or customer access line
charge; the CALC, so-called) of $1 per month until June 1, 1986
and $2 per month thereafter (R 643 et seq.).

In reaction to

proposals for Congressional intervention (R 644), the FCC
convened a federal-state Joint Board to study the subject.

The

Board recommended that the FCC waive the CALC for low-income
subscribers in states adopting a qualified lifeline plan, and
the FCC adopted the Board's recommendation (R 644).
At the beginning of the Utah proceedings, the
Commission raised several issues, including the issue whether
it had authority to establish a "lifeline" program.

Each

responding party concluded that the Commission had such
authority, if properly exercised (R 359-381).

Each analysis

was based on Mountain States Legal Fn. v. Utah Public Service
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Com'n, 636 P.2d 1047 (Utah 1981), the electricity lifeline
case.

The Commission then made a declaratory order reaching

the same conclusion, citing Mountain States and noting the
decision's requirements of a complete and fully explained
supporting record (Declaratory Order 1/3/86, Exhibit C; R 472
et seq.).
Lengthy adversarial hearings followed.

On December 1,

1986 all appearing parties entered into a settlement
stipulation (Exh. A; R 643 et seq.), which the Commission
approved.

Based thereon, and on the record, the Commission

found and concluded that in low-income households in this state
the telephone penetration figures are substantially lower than
the average for all customers (R 646, If 1), and that in low
income households higher local rates pose a threat of customer
drop-off from the telephone network (R 647). The stipulation
provided agreed projections as to the number of potential Utah
lifeline customers should a lifeline rate be adopted,
annualized carrier costs, and the surcharge rate needed to
recover the carriers' revenue deficiencies and costs (R
636-642).
The Commission promulgated the Lifeline Rules and
ordered the service beginning January 1, 1987.

The rules

establish a lifeline rate of $9.45 per month for those
subscribers qualifying for aid under specified programs
administered by the Department of Social Services (R 630). The
carriers having a higher rate (they are Bell, Contel, and
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Beehive) were directed to amend their tariffs to put the
lifeline rate into effect.

Eighty percent of the net revenue

losses and administrative costs of the participating carriers
is funded by an 18 cent monthly surcharge on non-lifeline
customers, and 20% is funded by a small surcharge upon
intrastate tolls and an access charge upon alternate toll
carriers (R 637).
The Commission's two Reports of December 17, 1987
supply its conclusions and explanations of the rates, the rate
classifications, and the administrative methods (R 636; R 643),
and these are explained further in the Commission's denials of
Bell's rehearing applications (R 673-5; R 684-7).
The lifeline rule is based in part upon the policy of
universal telephone service (Exh. B; R 647):
3.
The Commission has long supported the policy
of universal service, by which' is meant the offering
of affordable telephone service to as many of the
citizens of the State as possible. . ."
The Commission stated the conclusions that universal service
benefits all telephone customers; that its promotion means
greater communications access to all; that it enhances
business, the quality of life, and governmental efficiencies;
and that it avoids the stranding of capital facilities (Exh. B
V 4; R 647).
The Utah lifeline rule was held by the FCC to meet the
federal guidelines (R 682-3), with a resultant waiver of the
federal CALC for Utah lifeline customers.
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The record before the Court supports the findings and
conclusions.

See, e.g., the testimony of the Division's expert

witness Hinton:

R 10-11 as to telephone penetration levels; R

12-14 as to "externalities," or the economic benefits for
non-lifeline customers, and the State; R 14-15 as to the
avoidance of stranded facilities, and other customer drop-off
consequences; and R 67, agreement that a Bell customer benefits
from "customers staying on Continental's system and vice versa."

2.

Correction of Bell's statement of fgcts.

Bell's descriptions of the lifeline program and the
funding arrangement (Bell brief pp 4-6, "A" and "B") are
accurate, but its description of the effect of surcharge
pooling (Bell brief pp 6-8, "C") is materially distorted.

The

Bell brief purports to compare the Bell percentage of lifeline
customers (said to be 8% of its total residence lines) with
Contel's (purportedly 20%).

As is shown below, the actual

percentages, based upon the program as adopted, are:
6.38%, and Contel 7.85%.

Bell

Bell stipulated to the figures

(potential lifeline customers, residential line counts) that go
into these actual percentage computations (Exh. A, Attachments
1 and 2 ) .
Bell's brief assumes the preliminary projections in
the pre-filed testimony of the witness Hinton:

37,610

potential Bell lifeline customers (8% of 468,000 estimated
residential lines); and 2,028 Contel customers (20% of 10,000
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estimated residential lines).

The projections were based on a

lifeline program proposed preliminarily, which was modified
later.

The agreed final projections were based upon different

pricing, more accurate line counts, census statistics, and
experience in other states: Mountain Bell, 30,000 projected
participants (6.38% of 470,153 residence lines); Contel, 1,014
projected participants (7.85% of 12,918 residence lines).

See

Attachments 1 and 2 to Exh. A (R 643).
Bell grossly overstates the percentage difference.
The point of this correction is that the customer lifeline
participation is virtually identical in the two companies.
This means that the "subsidy" portion of the 18 cents that Bell
complains about is so small that it can scarcely be measured,
given the difference in the size of the two companies.

The

matter is discussed below in Point IV.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The standard-of-review precedent (the Utah Dept.

case) accords judicial deference to the decision below on the
Court's intermediate review standard:

the test is whether the

decision falls within the limits of reasonableness or
rationality.
Bell argues (Point I) that this is a Commission
decision construing general law, to be accorded no judicial
deference.
As Bell itself says, the theory of its appeal is a
theory of rate discrimination.

A resolution of that claim
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depends upon the validity of the customer classifications made,
and the Commission's application of special utilities statutes
in specific pricing situations.

The intermediate review

standard governs that kind of case.

Utah Dept. so holds.

Bell's appeal fails unless it can show irrationality below.
2.

Mountain Bell's appeal states a special theory of

statutory construction.

The theory asserts that the Commission

has no authority except what can be found in a "specific"
statutory delegation; the theory goes even further to assert
that a specific delegation constitutes also the denial of any
other authority in relation to the subject matter involved.
The second part of the theory rests upon the maxim expressio

vmiytg est exciygip aiterivs*
The specific-statute part of Bell's theory is not
supported by any cited case and is contrary to much settled
authority.

An exact precedent (Rio Grande Motor) rejects the

expressio-unius part of the argument.

Bell's brief does not

mention Rio Grande Motor.
The statutory construction principles stated in many
cases establish that a section of the utilities statutes is to
be construed by a reading in relation to other sections, in
relation to legislative purpose, and where useful in relation
to legislative history.

Because Bell's statutory construction

argument is erroneous, its rate discrimination claim (wholly
based on its construction theory) is without any foundation.
3.

The basic elements of the lifeline program

(pricing, administration) are clearly within Commission
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authority.

Bell does not argue otherwise/ and indeed supports

the program as Hcompletely reasonable."

The disputed surcharge

pooling element is one necessarily interrelated element,
dictated by the program's logic and its legal rationalization.
Bell's appeal, which concedes all of the program's factual and
theoretical validity but then singles out for attack only that
one element/ defeats itself.
4.

Bell's demonstration that the Commission can not

levy taxes has no consequence.

The problem of this appeal is

whether the rate classifications that impose and distribute the
surcharges are rational.

That is an ordinary ratemaking

problem/ and taxation has nothing to do with it.
5.

The Commission ruled that surcharge pooling is an

essential and interrelated element of the lifeline program.

If

the pooling element falls then the entire program falls.
The Court has held that its review authority extends
only to the correction of Commission error and# where
appropriate, to a remand for further Commission action.

The

Court would not have authority to order a continuation of this
lifeline program without its surcharge pooling element.

ARGUMENT
I.

UNDER THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW, THE
COURT NEED DETERMINE ONLY WHETHER THE RULING AS
TO SURCHARGE POOLING IS WITHIN THE LIMITS OF
REASONABLENESS OR RATIONALITY.

Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. Public Service Com'n,
658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983) analyzes the kinds of Commission
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decisions brought to the Court for review, and identifies three
categories accorded different levels of judicial deference to
regulatory expertise.
(a)

The review standards are:

No judicial deference is accorded a Commission

decision that only interprets general law; the decision is
corrected if it is in error.
(b)

Judicial deference is greatest where the

Commission has found a fact; evidence "of any substance
whatever" is sufficient to support such a finding.
(c)

An intermediate standard of deference is accorded

in a variety of cases, including conclusions as to mixed
law-and-fact problems, "reasonableness," questions of
special law, and the like.

To decisions of this kind the

Court accords a measure of deference described in the
decisions in various ways, all of which (Utah Dept. says)
are " . . . variations of the idea that the Commission's
decision must fall within the limits of reasonableness or
rationality."

658 P.2d 601, 610.

Bell says that this case raises only the issue whether
the Commission has authority to order the pooling of surcharges
among more than one carrier, and that a decision as to that is
a decision about general law to be reviewed without any
deference to the Commission.
Mountain 3611*s own Point III identifies the subject
matter (ratemaking) of the regulatory authority implicated
here, but claims an invalid exercise of it.
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Its theory for

this case is that the multi-company classification of customers
paying the surcharge, and the multi-company pooling, operate
discriminatorily as against Bell's customers.
discrimination case.

That is a rate

Its resolution turns upon the validity of

the customer classifications made by the Commission.

Mountain

States Legal Fn. v. Utah Pub. Serv., 636 P.2d 1047 (Utah 1981),
reviewed the validity of classifications made to establish an
electricity lifeline rate, and the funding mechanism.

That was

an intermediate-deference review, Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v.
Public Service Com'n, 658 P.2d 601, 611 n 17 (1983).

This case

is identical in kind.
The closest precedent for the Bell argument is
Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Com'n, 682 P.2d 858 (Utah
1984), a judicial review conducted on the no-deference
standard.

Kearns-Tribune held that the Commission had no

authority to adopt a rule that required a gas utility to put in
its advertising a "tagline" identifying the source of the
payment for the advertising.

The Court examined the public

utilities code and found no statute conferring any authority to
regulate utility advertising, or even referring to the
subject.

This case is distinguishable by the clear presence of

a regulatory subject matter, which Bell itself defines.

Bell's

reliance upon Utah Dept. of Admin. Serv. v. Public Service
Com'n, 658 P.2d 601 (it quotes only a selected and isolated
passage, Bell brief p 10-11) is obviously misplaced.

The

judicial review there was an intermediate-standard review.
Id., 658 P.2d 601, 612.
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To succeed here, Mountain Bell must show that the
classification process resulting in the surcharge pooling is
irrational.

II.

THE COMMISSION IS AUTHORIZED BY THE UTILITIES
STATUTES TO FUND THE TELEPHONE LIFELINE PROGRAM
THROUGH A POOLING OF LIFELINE SURCHARGES.

Mountain Bell does not dispute the Commission's
authority to implement a telephone lifeline program and to
provide for funding of the program through its ratemaking
power.

Mountain Bell objects only to the particular form of

funding chosen.

(Bell brief pp 5, 23-24)

However/ the

Commission has ample authority under the utilities statutes to
require joint or pooled funding of a jointly provided service
such as telephone access at lifeline rates.
The Commission's general statutory authority to
regulate public utilities and the services they provide is
found in § 54-4-1:
The commission is hereby vested with power and
jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public
utility in this state, and to supervise all of the
business of every such public utility in this state,
and to do all things, whether herein specifically
designated or in addition thereto, which are necessary
or convenient in the exercise of such power and
jurisdiction . . . . [Emp. added.]
Thus, the Commission need not be expressly authorized to do
every specific act it undertakes.

It is sufficient if the

challenged act is "necessary or convenient* to the exercise of
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the general power.

See, e.g., Utah Power and Light Co, v.

Public Serv. Com'n, 712 P.2d 251 (Utah 1985).
Section 54-4-1 must be read and construed with other
statutes expressly authorizing the Commission to regulate
public utility rates.

For example, § 54-3-1 requires that

rates be "just and reasonable," which is defined to include
consideration of the '•economic impact of charges on each
category of customer."

That section also mandates that all

public utility equipment and facilities be maintained and
utilized "as will be in all respects adequate, efficient, just
and reasonable."

Section 54-4-4 empowers the Commission to

monitor and maintain "just and reasonable" rates by order.

See

also § 54-4-7 (authorizing the Commission to prescribe rules
requiring public utilities to perform services at the rates and
on the conditions provided in the rules).

In addition, §§

54-4-8, 54-4-12, and 54-4-13 authorize the Commission to fix
joint rates for jointly provided services and to fix the
proportion of costs to be borne by each public utility.
Construed together, these statutes authorize the Commission to
fund the telephone lifeline program through a pooling of
surcharges.

See generally Mountain States Legal Fn. v. Utah

Pub. Serv., 636 P.2d 1047, 1055-57 (Utah 1981).
Specifically, the evidence presented at the hearings
supports the Commission's findings and conclusions that pooling
of lifeline surcharges is both necessary and convenient to
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adoption and proper functioning of the lifeline program.
Witnesses for the independent telephone companies testified
that customers of those companies "would have to pay a
substantially higher rate than Mountain Bell customers to fund
Lifeline service."

(R 686). Moreover, the evidence showed

that the independent companies "have a higher percentage of
subscribers who qualify for the Lifeline service, leaving a
lesser percentage of non-lifeline ratepayers to pay for the
program at substantially higher rates."

(R 686). The

Commission found:
Based upon that testimony and other evidence presented
to us in our rulemaking hearing on this matter, we
concluded that it would be unjust and unreasonable to
impose the Lifeline program on a company-specific
basis as Mountain Bell proposed, because the
Independents would be forced to so dramatically
increase the rates charged to their non-lifeline
subscribers as to make the program unworkable. We
concluded that there was no other alternative
mechanism to fund the Lifeline * program than through
the pooling of funds. [R 686; Bell Add., Exh. E, emp.
added.]
Thus, because the lifeline program is rendered
unworkable without a pooling of surcharges, pooling is
authorized by § 54-4-1 as "necessary and convenient" in the
exercise of the Commission's power to implement the lifeline
program.
Pooling, as a prerequisite of the lifeline program, is
also appropriate to the goal of universal service and to
maintain efficient utilization of equipment and facilities as
required by § 54-3-1.

The principles underlying universal
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service and the enhancement of the phone system by the
connection of additional customers, and the adverse
consequences if customers are forced to drop off the system by
higher charges, are described in the testimony (e.g., Hinton (R
10-15)) and further discussed in Point III below.

Universal

service is necessary for efficient utilization of the phone
system; the lifeline program is necessary to achieve universal
service; and pooling of surcharges is required to fund the
lifeline program.

(See Commission findings on the benefits of

universal service, R 646-47; Bell Add., Exh. C.)
In sum, the Commission is authorized to impose a
pooled rate to fund the lifeline program, and thereby advance
the industry toward universal service and enhance the value and
efficiency of the telephone system.

Bell statutory construction argument
Mountain Bell's appeal depends upon its special view
about the way the sections of the utilities code are to be
read.

It is argued that Commission authority '•must derive from

a specific statute"; the argument goes on to assert that a
delegation of such authority precludes any other authority
within that subject matter.

Reliance for the second part of

the theory is placed upon a maxim, expressio unius est exclusio
alterius (the translation supplied is "the expression of one
thing is the exclusion of another").

We are told that

expressio unius "is the law in Utah" (Bell brief p 21).
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(1) The specific-statute-only argument
Mountain Bell begins (Bell brief IIA# p 11) with the
generalization that the Commission, a creature of statute, has
only such powers as the statutes grant or imply.

The argument

proceeds that § 54-4-1, the broad authority statute, does not
"invest the Commission with unbridled discretion" to do
"anything it believes in the public interest."

Interwest Corp,

v. Public Service Commission, 510 P.2d 919 (Utah 1973), Basin
Flying Service v, Pyfrlic Service Commission, 531 P.2d 1303
(Utah 1975), and Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Com'n, 682
P.2d 858 (Utah 1984), are cited.
Of course no one considers that the Commission has
unbridled discretion to do whatever it deems in the public
interest.

The truism that § 54-4-1 does not do that has no

logical connection with what Bell purports to deduce:

that the

Commission has no authority at all except what a "specific"
statute delegates.

If by this Bell means that every broadly

phrased statute must be read out of the utilities code
(respondents take this to be the implication of the argument),
then no authority supports the deduction and Bell cites none.
The fallacy of the specific-statute-only part of
Bell's statutory construction theory is shown in White River
Shale Oil v. Pub. Serv. Com'n, 700 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Utah 1985):
The provisions of the entire Public Utilities
Act, U.C.A., 1953 §§ 54-1-1 to -11-10 (1974 & Supp.
1983), must be considered in determining whether there
are sufficient guidelines established by the
legislature. However, the primary sources of guidance
are the declarations of legislative goals and policies
which an agency is to apply when exercising its
delegated powers.

These declarations need only be as specific as
the circumstances warrant. The legislature need not
lay down a detailed and specific set of guidelines
which covers every conceivable problem that might
arise in implementing the legislation. It is
sufficient if there are general policies and standards
articulated which provide direction to an
administrative body possessing the expertise to adapt
the legislative goals to varying circumstances.
(2) Expressip Vnius
The second part of Bell's statutory construction
argument depends upon the expressio-unius maxim and three
cases2 that employ it as a construction aid.

The argument from

the maxim is that a specific delegation of authority means also
that the Commission has no other authority in relation to the
subject matter treated.
The identical argument was made, and the Court
squarely rejected it, in Rio Grande Motorway, Inc. v. Public
Service Com'n, 21 Utah 2d 377, 445 P.2dx990, 991-2 (1968):
The plaintiffs' argument is that inasmuch as the
legislature expressly granted the Commission power to
grant temporary operating authority to contract
carriers, by implication, it precluded the issuance of
such authority to common motor carriers. This is
based on Sec. 54-6-10, U.C.A. 1953:
The commission shall have power, without a
hearing, to issue temporary, seasonal or
emergency permits to contract motor carriers in
intrastate commerce, . . . .
Such permits and
licenses may be issued upon such information,
application or request therefor, as the
commission may prescribe . . . .
but in no event
2

Hansen v. Wilkinson, 658 P.2d 1216 (Utah 1983); Cannon v.
Gardner, 611 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1980); and Olympia Sales Co. v.
Long, 604 P.2d 919 (Utah 1979).
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shall any temporary, seasonal or emergency permit or
license be issued for a period of time greater than
sizty days in length • . . .
Reliance is placed upon the maxim "expressio
unius est exclusio alterius." It is appreciated that
the maxim is sometimes helpful in determining the
meaning of an otherwise questionable statute. But its
only usefulness is for that purpose: as a rule of
construction. It has no force of law; and it has no
proper application when its effect would be to
obstruct rather than to carry out the purpose of the
statute. It has been aptly said that it is "a
valuable servant, but a dangerous master." Whether it
is helpful in understanding the intended effect of a
statute depends upon an anlysis of the legislative
enactment to which it is sought to be applied. It is
therefore appropriate to look to the provisions and
purposes of the statutes relating to enfranchising and
regulating motor carriers. [Interior citations
omitted.]
Bell's brief omits any reference to the decision.

The statutory construction precedents
The fallacy of Bell's statutory construction argument
emerges even more clearly when viewed in the light of the
statutory construction principles taught in the decisions
construing the utilities code.

Some of the recent cases are:

Rio Grande Motorway, Inc. v. Public Service ConTn 21 Utah 2d
377, 445 P.2d 990 (1968) (statutes read in relation to other
statutes, and in relation to legislative purpose and history);
Mountain States Legal Fn. v. Utah Pub. Serv., 636 P.2d 1047,
1055 (Utah 1981) (examines and applies unexpressed, but
logically necessary, relation of § 54-3-1 (just and reasonable
rates) to § 54-3-8 (non-discriminatory rates)); Kearns-Tribune
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. ConTn, 682 P.2d 858 (Utah 1984) (operation
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of broadly stated § 54-4-1 narrowed by examination of utilities
code showing entire absence of any reference to subject sought
to be regulated) Big K Corp. v. Public Service Com'n, 689 P..2d
1349,

1355 (Utah 1984) (general term "public convenience and

necessity" in former § 54-6-5 (1973 Code) construed as
fostering motor carrier competition when feasible, a
construction determined not inconsistent with provision in
former § 54-6-4 against "unnecessary duplication" of service);
Utah Deptt Qt PU5t Reqt v> PvfrUc Service Cpm'n, 720 P.2d 420,
423 (Utah 1986) (limitation upon general § 54-4-1 authority,
and upon the interim ratemaking authority of § 54-7-12(3)(d),
by other sections permitting prospective rates only); and White

River sheie Oil vf Pyfr, Serv, ConTh, 700 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Utah
1985) (reach of general authority in § 54-4-1 to issue orders,
and authority in § 54-7-4.5 to issue cease-and-desist orders,
construed by reference to declarations of legislative goals and
policies, and to Constitution).

Analogy of toll PQplinq
An obvious problem for Mountain Bell is that it must
explain away the analogy between the surcharge pooling it
attacks here and the long-accepted industry practice of pooling
intrastate toll revenues.
Bell would distinguish the two pools this way (Bell
brief pp 19-22):

it says toll pooling is authorized by

§ 54-4-12, which mandates the interconnections of the
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facilities of the telephone carriers.

Bell would differentiate

the toll pooling there authorized from surcharge pooling by an
exoressio unius reading of § 54-4-12:

toll service is -jointly

provided," so a pooling of toll revenues is authorized by the
"physical connection between the two companies relating to the
provision of such service."

In claimed distinction, lifeline

service ". . .is not a jointly provided service";

it is local

and involves only one carrier.
There is no such distinction.

Toll service can of

course involve an inter-company connection of facilities, but
that is not necessarily the case and as to most Utah toll calls
it is not the case.

The revenues of the many toll calls

totally switched, carried, and terminated by Mountain Bell are
pooled; in the same way, the revenues of a call wholly handled
by Contel are also pooled.

The pool is divided among the

intrastate companies without any reference to participation in
any particular call.
The statutory basis for toll pooling is the same as
that for the surcharge pooling ordered in this case; it lies in
the Legislature's mandate that the telephone carriers
interconnect their facilities, and the statutes that empower
the Commission to regulate two or more carriers together and to
apportion their costs where appropriate.

The legislative

purpose is stated, and the authority is delegated, in §
54-4-12, which Bell seeks to avoid, and in other sections Bell
does not mention:

e.g., § 54-4-8 (Commission can require

-22-

additions, or extensions, "by any public utility, or any two or
more public utilities," with provision for common regulation
and apportionment of cost); § 54-4-13(1) (ordered joint use of
facilities); § 54-3-1 (charges made "by any public utility, or
by any two or more" utilities shall be just and reasonable);
and § 54-3-4 (provision for joint tariffs and concurrences).
Toll pooling is a practical construction of these
statutes:

common regulation of more than one carrier is

authorized in an appropriate case.

This statutory construction

by the industry and the regulator has the force of having been
in place for a long time.

The identical statutory construction

authorizes surcharge pooling.
The statutes referred to in the discussion above
construed in accordance with the decisions, fully support the
conclusion that surcharge pooling is authorized.

III. THE LIFELINE RULE, INCLUDING ITS POOLED SURCHARGE
FUNDING ELEMENT, IS A VALID EXERCISE OF
COMMISSION AUTHORITY.
Mountain Bell's Point III identifies ratemaking as the
source of the regulatory authority exercised here, but argues
that surcharge pooling is an improper exercise of that
authority.

Because the argument isolates the surcharge pooling

element, it fails to consider that element in its relation to
the whole program.

Limited by this approach, the Bell brief

omits any reference to the Commission's conclusions about
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telephone subscription in low income households and about
customer drop-off, and does not refer in any way to the
consequences of those factors for the policy of universal
telephone service.

Universal service
The goal of universal service reflects a special
characteristic of telecommunications.

Apart from the

generalization that any utility system (gas, telephone,
electric) is bettered by the connection of additional customers
(within limits, economies of scale lower unit costs), a
telephone system is improved in a different way when additional
connections are achieved:

each telephone in the network can

reach additional telephones.
consequences:

Customer drop-off has opposite

not only does it threaten stranded plant (thus

raising costs of service) but also it diminishes the usefulness
of the instruments remaining in the network.
Universal service is defined by the Commission as
". . . the offering of affordable telephone service to as many
of the citizens of the State as possible" (Exh. A; R 647 1f
3).3

As the Commission noted, universal service has the

3

The Wyoming Commission has stated a like definition (AT&T
Communications of the Mountain States, Inc., 61 PUR 4th 102,
Wyo. PSC 7/16/84: "The clear purpose of Wyoming public utility
statutes is universal service; i.e., the availability of
utility service at just and reasonable rates to all the Wyoming
public.")
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approval of the Congress4 and the FCC.

A much-quoted

formulation is stated in one of the divestiture decisions,
United States v. Western Elec. Co., Inc.. 569 F. Supp. 990, 997
(DCDC 1983):
". . • the goal of universal service . . . [is]
the goal of providing affordable telephone service to
all, including those who are not affluent or who
reside in relatively isolated areas.
(The court's related note (p 997 n 32) is: -E.g., in
some of the western and midwestern states, where the
cost of providing service far exceeds that of
connecting
ting up telephones in densely-populated
cities . - ) 5

4

The reference is to Section 1 of the Communications Act
of 1934 (47 U.S.C. § 151): The A c f s -purpose" is ". . .to
make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the
United States . . . communication service with adequate
facilities at reasonable charges . . ."
5

The court stated the universal service definition in
connection with an expression of irritation at the FCC's CALC
(569 F.Supp 990, 997-8):
. . . If the objective of telephone service
available at reasonable rates to all is not to be
jeopardized, it is therefore most important that local
rates not be burdened by unnecessary increases. As
the Court repeatedly pointed out in its August 11,
1982, Opinion (especially in connection with the
discussion of the access charge issue (see infra))
there is no legitimate basis for using the
reorganization of the Bell System as a means for
undermining the universal service objective or as an
excuse for raising local rates.
The Court has therefore noted with considerable
surprise and some dismay that the Federal
Communications Commission, far from using the access
charge tool as a means for easing the burdens on the
(Footnote 5 continued on next page.)
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Mountain Bell's brief does not face up to the
implications of the Commission's universal service reasoning.
If the lifeline program is supportable because it benefits the
telephone network as a network, and avoids drop-off damage to
the network (Bell says it supports all this), then that
reasoning refutes the Bell argument that the funding mechanism
must be kept "company specific."
Cl9SSifiC9tiQn
The precedent governing this surcharge pooling issue
is Mountain States Legal Fn. v. Utah Pub. Serv., 636 P.2d 1047
(Utah 1981).

The Court there held that a lifeline rate is not

per se unlawful, but that in that instance the Commission had
exercised its authority erroneously.

Its general findings

about electricity usage by senior citizens and that group's
ability to pay, supplied no explanation for the exclusion of

(Footnote 5 continued.)
users of local telephone service, has opted instead,
in a major decision issued since the Court's approval
of the consent decree, to saddle the local subscribers
with the access costs of interexchange carriers,
[citations omitted]
Concern about CALC-caused damage to universal service prompted
the Joint Board's CALC-waiver recommendation to the FCC. The
same concern partly underlies the Commission action under
review here.
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others from the lowered rate classification, nor any
explanation why the shortfall burden was borne by a class
including some, but not all, of the other ratepayers.
Mountain Bell says nothing about the classification
analysis that is the essence of Mountain States.

The opinion

analyzes the interrelationship of two rate statutes:

§ 54-3-1

mandates "just and reasonable" utility rates, and supplies a
definition of that term;

§ 54-3-8 forbids a rate that grants a

preference or subjects anyone to disadvantage.
The relevant sentences of § 54-3-1 are:
All charges made, demanded or received by any
public utility, or by any two or more public
utilities, for any product or commodity furnished or
to be furnished, or for any service rendered or to be
rendered, shall be just and reasonable. . . • The
scope of definition "just and reasonable" may include,
but shall not be limited to, the cost of providing
service to each category of customer, economic impact
of charges on each category of customer, and on the
well-being of the State of Utah; methods of reducing
wide periodic variations in demand of such products,
commodities or services, and means of encouraging
conservation of resources and energy.
Section 54-3-8 provides:
No public utility shall, as to rates, charges,
service, facilities or in any other respect, make or
grant any preference or advantage to any person, or
subject any person to any prejudice or disadvantage.
No public utility shall establish or maintain any
unreasonable difference as to rates, charges, service
or facilities, or in any other respect, either as
between localities or as between classes of service.
The commission shall have power to determine any
question of fact arising under this section.
Mountain States holds that the just-and-reasonable standards of
§ 54-3-1 may be considered to determine whether there is a §
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54-3-8 preference.

The conclusion is drawn not from the

specific language of § 54-3-8 but from the interior logic, and
the practical operation, of the sections taken together (636.
P.2d 1047, 1055):
Although the legislature did not amend the
preference statute, § 54-3-8, it necessarily follows
that the standards stated in § 54-3-1 must be
considered, at least to some extent, in determining
whether a rate accorded one group of consumers is
preferential. It would be impossible to give proper
force and effect to the stautory standards in the rate
of return section if the Commission could not deal
with classes of customers which have common
characteristics based on those standards.
Further, 636 P.2d 1047, 1055:
. . . It is discriminations with no rational
basis, and discriminations based on factors foreign to
the regulatory scheme, which are aimed at by the
preference statute.
In terms of Bell's claim of rate discrimination here, Mountain
States means that factors sufficient to^ justify multi-company
lifeline pricing can serve also to justify a multi-company
funding, if the explanation is rational.

Surely the

Commission's full and careful explanations in this record are
sufficient to meet any claim of irrational rate discrimination
in this case.
The Mountain States opinion also describes, in a way
directly applicable here, the classification process in
ratemaking (636 P.2d 1047, 1052-3):
Classification of customers must necessarily be
accomplished by reference to general characteristics
having some rational nexus with the criteria used for
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determining just and reasonable rates. Whether cost
of service, value of service, or other criteria are
used, either alone or in conjunction with each other,
classifications of persons must be on the basis of
similar — but not identical — characteristics. Were
it not so, the PSC would have to establish individual
rates for each customer — a wholly uneconomic and
impracticable, if not impossible, task. Moreover, no
matter what classifications may be established, the
disciplines of accounting and economics are not so
precise, or so unified on cost allocation theories or
the proper theoretical foundations for rate making
generally, as to agree on all the relevant factors and
standards to be considered in arriving at rates and
classifications acknowledged to be equitable. Beyond
that, there are broad public policy issues, whether
implicitly or explicitly recognized, which are
necessarily affected by whatever classifications of
customers are recognized.
This decision to pool the surchages is valid ratemaking.
IV.

THE SURCHARGE POOLING IS NOT A TAX.

Mountain Bellfs Point IV (Bell brief pp 27-28)
demonstrates, at some length, that the Commission is without
taxing authority, and goes on to argue that because the
surcharge distribution is a "tax" ("the enforced contribution
by Bell customers to subsidize non-Bell customers") it is
unlawful.

Bell says:

" . . . once the Commission required

Mountain Bell customers to subsidize Lifeline customers in
other companies (i.e., once the subsidy flowed beyond the
boundaries of Mountain Bell's service territory), the
Commission crossed the boundary between appropriate ratemaking
and illegal taxation."

(Bell brief p 29).

The correction of Bell's purported comparison of
relative lifeline participations (part 2 of factual statement,
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p. 8 above) shows how insignificant in practical terms the
H

subsidyH really is.

It is even more trifling if account is

taken of the "subsidy* accruing back to Bell's customers
through the 20% portion of the pool funded by the surcharges on
intrastate tolls, and access charges on alternate carriers, all
of which Bell ignores.
"Subsidy" (to employ Bell's term) is inherent in any
telephone rate structure, including Bell's:

Bell's toll

callers subsidize (or are subsidized by) the multi-company toll
pool; Bell's non-lifeline customers subsidize its lifeline
customers; the Bell customer who lives close to the exchange
switch subsidizes the remote customer served at many times the
cost.

All of this is inherent in ratemaking, Mountain States

Legal Fn. v. Utah Pub. Serv., 636 P.2d 1047 (Utah 1981), and
"taxation" has nothing to do with any of it.
The Commission very properly and reasonably weighed
the minor imbalances of the surcharge pooling contributions as
against the plainly unworkable imbalance of burden upon the
non-lifeline customers of the much smaller independent carriers
that would have resulted if a company-specific lifeline funding
had been employed.
By way of suggesting that the Commission decision not
to impose the surcharge on the non-lifeline customers of the
non-participating carriers was based upon a "taxation" theory,
Bell submits the footnoted comment that it is "fairly obvious .
. . [that] to do so would clearly go beyond the Commission's
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ratemaking power into the area of illegal taxation.

There is

no practical or legal distinction . . ." (Bell brief p 30 n 11).
Putting to one side the problem whether Bell has
standing to raise the point (and, indeed, the whole appeal after all, none of the surcharge money is Bell's; it is
ratepayer money; Bell's revenue losses and all its costs are
reimbursed totally), the distinction between the carriers is
obvious.

The Commission concluded that the reasons for the

lifeline rule (concerns about subscriber penetration and
drop-off) were not applicable to carriers having a local rate
below the $9.45 lifeline rate it chose, a conclusion that can
scarcely be called irrational.

The record (Hinton R 19)

supports the conclusion.
Mountain Bell's taxation point has no merit.

V.

THE CONSEQUENCE OF A JUDICIAL VACATION OF
SURCHARGE POOLING WOULD BE THE VACATION OF THE
LIFELINE PROGRAM IN ITS ENTIRETY.

Mountain Bell asks the Court (Bell brief p 30) to set
aside only the pooling of the lifeline surcharges and,
presumably, to leave the rest of the program (which Bell
supports) alone.
If the assumption of that prayer is that the Lifeline
Rules could continue intact and effective without surcharge
pooling then it ignores the essential interrelationship of the
lowered rate and its funding mechanism.

The program will not

work without the pooling, and the Commission explicitly so
concluded (R 686).
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The review authority conferred on the Court has been
held to have limits:

the Court can affirm the Commission, or

it can set aside an erroneous action and remand a matter; in
this instance it would be without authority to rewrite a
program the elements of which are as interrelated as these
are.

§ 54-7-16; Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public

Service Com'n, 107 Utah 502, 155 P.2d 104; on rehearing 107
Utah 530, 158 P.2d 935; Salt Lake Transfer Company v. Public
Service Com'n, 11 U.2d 121, 355 P.2d 706 (1960).

If the

surcharge pooling falls as Mountain Bell demands then the whole
program falls too.

CONCLUSION
Mountain Bell's review petition should be denied.
DATED, October / V . 1987.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM 1 - STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated 1953 (1986 Repl. Vol. 6A)
§ 54-3-1
§ 54-3-4
§ 54-3-8
§ 54-4-1
§ 54-4-7
§ 54-4-8
§ 54-4-12
§ 54-4-13(1)
ADDENDUM 2 - PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ORDERS
EXHIBIT A -

Stipulation, Case No. 85-999-13

EXHIBIT B -

December 17, 1986 Report and Order,
Case No. 85-999-13

EXHIBIT C -

January 3, 1986 Declaratory Order,
Case No. 85-999-13

ADDENDUM 1
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated 1953 (1986 Repl. Vol. 6A)

54-3-1. Charges must be just; service adequate; rules reasonable.
All charges made, demanded or received by any public utility, or by any two
or more public utilities, for any product or commodity furnished or to be
furnished, or for any service rendered or to be rendered, shall be just and
reasonable. Every uqjust or unreasonable charge made, demanded or received
for such product or commodity or service is hereby prohibited and declared
unlawful. Every public utility shall furnish, provide and maintain such service, instrumentalities, equipment and facilities as will promote the safety,
health, comfort and convenience of its patrons, employees and the public, and
as will be in all respects adequate, efficient, just and reasonable. All rules and
regulations made by a public utility affecting or pertaining to its charges or
service to the public shall be just and reasonable. The scope of definition ^just
and reasonable" may include, but shall not be limited to, the cost of providing
service to each category of customer, economic impact of charges on each
category of customer, and on the well-being of the state of Utah; methods of
reducing wide periodic variations in demand of such products, commodities or
services, and means of encouraging conservation of resources and energy.

64-3-4. Joint tariffs.
The names of the several public utilities which are parties to any joint
tariff, rate, fare, toll, contract, classification or charge shall be specified in the
schedule or schedules showing the same. Unless otherwise ordered by the
commission, a schedule showing such joint tariff, rate, toll, fare, contract,
classification or charge need be filed with the commission by only one of the
parties to it, provided there is also filed with the commission, in such form as
the commission may require, a concurrence in such joint tariff, rate, toll, fare,
contract, classification or charge by each of the other parties thereto.

64-3-8. Preferences forbidden — Power of commission.
No public utility shall, as to rates, charges, service, facilities or in any other
respect, make or grant any preference or advantage to any person, or subject
any person to any prejudice or disadvantage. No public utility shall establish
or maintain any unreasonable difference as to rates, charges, service or facilities, or in any other respect, either as between localities or as between classes
of service. The commission shall have power to determine any question of fact
arising under this section.

64-4-1. General jurisdiction.
The commission is hereby vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise
and regulate every public utility in this state, and to supervise all of the
business of every such public utility in this state, and to do all things, whether
herein specifically designated or in addition thereto, which are necessary or
convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction; provided, however,
that the department of transportation shall have jurisdiction over those safety
functions transferred to it by the Department of Transportation Act.

54-4-7. Rules, equipment, service — Regulation after hearing.
Whenever the commission shallfind,after a hearing, that the rules, regulations, practices, equipment, appliances, facilities, or service of any public utility, or the methods of manufacture, distribution, transmission, storage or
supply employed by it, are unjust, unreasonable, unsafe, improper, inadequate or insufficient, the commission shall determine the just, reasonable,
safe, proper, adequate or sufficient rules, regulations, practices, equipment,
appliances, facilities, service or methods to be observed, furnished, constructed, enforced or employed, and shall fix the same by its order, rule or
regulation. The commission, after a hearing, shall prescribe rules and regulations; for the performance of any service or the furnishing of any commodity of
the character furnished or supplied by any public utility, and on proper demand and tender of rates such public utility shall furnish such commodity or
render such service within the time and upon the conditions provided in such
rules.

54-4-8. Improvements, extensions, repairs — Regulations
— Apportioning costs.
Whenever the commission shall find that additions, extensions, repairs or
improvements to or changes in the existing plant, equipment, apparatus, facilities or other physical property of any public utility or of any two or more
public utilities ought reasonably to be made, or that a new structure or structures ought to be erected to promote the security or convenience of its employees or the public or in any way to secure adequate service or facilities, the
commission shall make and serve an order directing that such additions,
extensions, repairs, improvements or changes be made or such structure or
structures be erected in the manner and within the time specified in said
order. If any additions, extensions, repairs, improvements or changes, or any
new structure or structures which the commission has ordered to be erected,
require joint action by two or more public utilities, the commission shall
notify the said public utilities that such additions, extensions, repairs, improvements or changes, or new structure or structures have been ordered, and
that the same shall be made at their joint cost; whereupon the said public
utilities shall have such reasonable time as the commission may grant within
which to agree upon the portion or division of cost of such additions, extensions, repairs, improvements or changes or any new structure or structures
which each shall bear. If at the expiration of such time such public facilities
shall fail to file with the commission a statement that an agreement has been
made for division or apportionment of the cost or expense of such additions,
extensions, repairs, improvements or changes, or of such new structure or
structures, the commission shall have authority, after further hearing, to
make an order fixing the proportion of such cost or expense to be borne by
each public utility and the manner in which the same shall be paid or secured.

54-4-12. Telegraph and telephone — Connections — Joint
rates — Division.
Whenever the commission shall find, after a hearing, that a physical connection can reasonably be made between the lines of two or more telephone
corporations, or two or more telegraph corporations, whose lines can be made
to form a continuous line of communication by the construction and maintenance of suitable connections for the transfer of messages or conversations,
and that public convenience and necessity will be subserved thereby, or shall
find that two or more telegraph or telephone corporations have failed to establish joint rates, tolls or charges for service by or over their said lines and that
joint rates, tolls or charges ought to be established, the commission may, by
its order, require that such connection be made, except where the purpose of
such connection is primarily to secure the transmission of local messages or
conversations between points within the same city or town, and that conversations be transmitted and messages transferred over such connections under
such rules and regulations as the commission may establish and prescribe,
and that through lines and joint rates, tolls and charges be made and be used,
observed and be in force in the future. If such telephone or telegraph corporations do not agree upon the division between themselves of the cost of such
physical connection or connections, or upon the division of the joint rates, tolls
or charges established by the commission over such through lines, the commission shall have authority, after a further hearing, to establish such division by supplemental order.

54-4-13. Joint use of properties by utilities — Adjustment
of costs — Cable television easement rights.
(1) Whenever the commission shall find that public convenience and necessity require the use by one public utility of the conduits, subways, tracks,
wires, poles, pipes or other equipment, or any part thereof, on, over or under
any street or highway, belonging to another public utility, and that such use
will not result in irreparable injury to the owner or other users of such conduits, subways, tracks, wires, poles, pipes or other equipment, or in any substantial detriment to the service, and that such public utilities have failed to
agree upon such use or the terms and conditions or compensation for the
same, the commission may, by order, direct that such use be permitted, and
prescribe a reasonable compensation and reasonable terms and conditions for
the joint use. If such use is directed, the public utility to whom the use is
permitted shall be liable to the owner or other users of such conduits,
subways, tracks, wires, poles, pipes or other equipment for such damage as
may result therefrom to the property of such owner or other users thereof.
(2) Whenever a public utility including its successors, assigns, lessees, licensees and agents, is granted a right-of-way easement to construct, operate,
maintain or remove utility facilities, electric power and other facilities as it
may require upon, over, under and across land or upon, over, under and across
a dedicated public utility strip, and such public utility has also entered into a
pole attachment contract with a cable television company which has been

granted a franchise by a city, county, municipal or other public authority
including the right to use the wires, conduits, cables, or poles of such public
utility, and providing for the attachment or installation of wires, cables, and
other equipment of a cable television company, to certain poles or in certain
conduits of such public utility under controlled conditions designed to ensure
the continued safe operation of the utilities service and facilities without any
additional burden on the grantor's property then, and in that event, the cable
television company, has the right to share in and enjoy the use of the right-ofway easement, subject to the terms and conditions provided in the pole attachment contract, and the right-of-way easement or interest granted the public
utility is apportionable to the cable television company under the following
limitations or conditions:
(a) Consent is securedfromthe private property owner where the easement is located except this requirement shall not apply in the case of a
dedicated public utility strip.
(b) The public service commission determines that under the terms and
conditions of the pole attachment contract the use of the utilities facilities
by the cable television company will not interfere with the primary utility function or render its facilities unsafe, and that the contract is in the
public interest.
(c) The right-of-way easement is not restricted to the sole use of the
public utility; provided, that such restriction shall not apply in any easement granted for the use of a dedicated public utility strip.
(d) The use contemplated by the cable television company is the same
or similar to that granted the public utility and that such use will not
impose an additional burden upon the servient tenement.
(e) The use of the easement by the cablfe television company will not
cause irreparable injury or damage to the grantor's property.

ADDENDUM 2 - PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ORDERS
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EXHIBIT C - January 3, 1986 Declaratory Order,
Case No. 85-999-13
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- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH In the Matter of the Rulemaking
for the Establishment of Lifeline
Telephone Service Rates for all
Regulated Local Exchange Carriers
in the State of Utah

)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO, 85-999-13
STIPULATION

The
Mountain
States
Telephone
and Telegraph Company
(Mountain Bell), AT&T Communications of the Mountain States
(AT&T), the Continental Telephone Company of the West (Contel),
the Exchange Carriers of Utah, the Utah Division of Public
Utilities (Division), the Utah State Committee of Consumer
Services
(Committee), the Salt Lake Area Community Action
Program and Utah Issues, being all parties of record in the
above
captioned
proceeding,
hereby
submit the following
Stipulation to
the
Public
Service
Commission
of
Utah
(Commission).
1.
All parties agree with the assumptions, estimates,
data and calculations used to develop the 1987 annualized cost
projections for lifeline telephone service provided by: (a)
Beehive Telephone Company; (b) Contel; and (c) Mountain Bell;
as presented in Attachments 1 thru 3.
2.
All parties request that the local exchange carriers
required to provide lifeline telephone service be required to
file tariff revisions, within twenty days of the date of the
Commission's order in this matter, to implement a lifeline
telephone service surcharge rate at $0.18 per access line
(trunk) for non-lifeline subscribers.
3.
All parties agree with the assumptions, estimates,
data and calculations used to develop the 1987 annualized cost
projections for: (a) the Commission's administration of the
lifeline telephone service surcharge revenue pool and the Utah
Department of Social Service's administration of the lifeline
telephone service eligibility and verification procedures; (b)
the lifeline telephone service revenue requirement that should
be recovered from the surcharges on intraLATA toll services and
on intraLATA and interLATA switched access services (pursuant
to the Commission's Rule, 20 percent of Section 2 (a)); and (c)
the surcharge rate percentage for subscribers of intraLATA toll
services and for intraLATA and interLATA switched access services; as presented in Attachment 4.
4.
All parties request that all local exchange and intrastate interexchange carriers regulated by the Commission be
required to file tariff revisions, within twenty days of the
date of the Commission's order in this matter, to implement
lifeline telephone service surcharge rates based on: (a) 0.65

ooofi2n

-2percent of the subscriber's monthly bill for intrastate intraLATA and interLATA message telecommunications
(and optional
toll) services (MTS) and wide area telecommunications service
(WATS); and (b) 1.88 percent of the monthly bill for intrastate
intraLATA and interLATA switched access services provided to
resale carriers (Defined, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section
54-2-1 (30), as "any person which provides, on a resale basis,
any telephone or telecommunication service which is purchased
from a telephone corporation.").
5.
All parties agree that six months after the implementation date for the lifeline telephone service and the surcharge rates, and every six months thereafter, the Commission
should conduct a proceeding to:
(a)

Review the local exchange carriers'
lifeline telephone service reports,
suant to the Commission's rule;

semi-annual
filed pur-

(b)

Review the amount of surcharge revenues collected
from non-lifeline local exchange service, MTS,
WATS and access service subscribers during the
preceding six months;

(c)

Review requests by local exchange carriers providing lifeline telephone service for payments
from the surcharge revenue pool,* as presented in
Attachment 5;

(d)

Review requests by the Commission and by the Utah
Department of Social Services for payments from
the surcharge revenue pool to cover their administrative costs associated with
the
lifeline
telephone service program;

(e)

Receive surcharge revenue payments from interexchange carriers regulated by the Commission and
from local exchange carriers that do not provide
lifeline telephone service, pursuant to the Commission's rule, or which collect surcharge revenues in excess their lifeline telephone service
revenue requirement (see Attachment 5 ) ;

(f)

Review the local exchange carriers' projections
of lifeline telephone service subscribers, revenue requirements and surcharge revenues for the
next six months.

(g)

Review actions by the State Legislature to increase or decrease the funded portion of the
Standard Needs Budget of the Utah Department of
Social Services attributable for telephone service ;
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-3(h)

Consider revisions in the level of the lifeline
telephone service rate or the surcharge rates.

6.
The Division agrees that it will audit and review all
filings by the local exchange carriers in the lifeline service
summary review proceeding for accuracy and reasonableness.
7.
All parties agree that cost studies used by local
exchange
carriers
to
estimate
their
administrative and
installation costs for lifeline telephone service will
be
furnished to the Commission thirty days prior to the first
summary review proceeding and every two-years thereafter.
8.
All parties agree that any revisions in the local
exchange
carriers'
rates
for
residential local exchange
services, MTS, WATS or switched access services which would
affect their lifeline telephone service revenue requirements or
surcharge revenues should be accounted in the next lifeline
service review proceeding.
9.
This Stipulation reflects agreement by all parties as
to the procedures to administer the lifeline telephone service
program as well as the initial lifeline telephone service surcharge rates. It does not in any way limit the right of any
party to exercise all legal rights available to them, including
the right to seek rehearing or review of the Commission's Rule
or the Order ultimately adopted by the Commission or to appeal
such Rule or Order if they so choose.
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of December, 1986.
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY

*yjji

Ted D. Smith, Attorney

AT&T COMMUNICATIONS OF THE
MOUNTAIN STATES

KlLUMi. p. CiGiJzS

-4CONTINENTAL TELEPHONE COMPANY
OF THE WEST
t*s—\qtrvyVjt^
By.
John H. Horsley, Attorney
EXCHANGE CARRIERS OF UTAH

DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES

By ^Uflf-^s)
Brian W. Burnett
Assistant Attorney General
COMMITTEE OF CONSUMER SERVICES

M. Tanndr
Assistant Attorney General
SALT LAKE AREA COMMUNITY ACTION
PROGRAM and UT^lV ISSUES

VJL
By.
Bruce M. Plenk, Attorney
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:achment 1
UTAH LIFELINE COSTS AND REVENUES
CALCULATIONS
Mountain Bell
-ticipating Customers (50"/. of 60,000 el igables)
4 Hookups
4 Exisitng Customers
»idence Lines
^lifeline Lines
»iness Lines
Historical
"rent Rate
Feline Rate
^recurring Rate
Cost Study
irecurring Cost
rwersion Cost

30,000 est
7,500
22,500
470,153
440,153
140,052
*13.13
* 9.45
•43.00
*53.0B
•10.69

Revenue loss from participating lifeline customers
(current rate x participation x 12)
(*4,726,800.00)
Revenue gain from participating lifeline customers
(lifeline rate x participation x 12)
3,402,000.00
Nonrecurring Cost
(cost x new hookups)

(398,100.00)

Coversion Cost
(cost x new exisiting)

(240,525.00)

Nonrecurri ng revenues
(1/2 rate x new hookups)
Administrative Costs
a) printing of notification letters
b) business reply postage on
questionnare
c) publicity ( customer notification)
d) other
Total
)TAL COSTS DUE TO LIFELINE
>7. of Total
ircharge

($1,476,700.00)
1,476,700.00/580,205/12 = *0.21

161,250.00
15,000.00
8,700.00
20,000.00
743,700.00)
(*1,845,875.00)

Attachment 2
UTAH LIFELINE COSTS AND REVENUES
CALCULATIONS
Continental Telephone Company
Participating Customers (50/i of 2,028 eligables)
New Hookups
New Exisitng Customers
Residence Lines
Nonlifeline Lines
Business Lines
Historical
Current Rate
Lifeline Rate
Nonrecurring Rate
Nonrecurring Cost
Cost Study
Conversion Cost

1,014 est
254
760
12,918
12,158
*13.26
* 9-45
*44.00
*44.00
* 7.56

1. Revenue loss -from participating lifeline customers
(current rate x participation x 12)
(# 161,348.00)
Revenue gain from participating lifeline customers
(lifeline rate x participation x 12)
114,988.00
2.

3.
4.

Nonrecurring Cost
(cost x new hookups)

( 11,176.00)

Coversion Cost
(cost x new exisiting)

(

Nonrecurring revenues
(1/2 rate x new hookups)

5,588.00

Administrative Costs
a) printing of notification letters
b) business reply postage on
questionnare
c) publicity ( customer notification)
d) other
Total

TOTAL COSTS DUE TO LIFELINE
807. of Total
surcharge

(*

5,746.00)

( 9,982.00)
(*

67,676.00)

54,141.00)
54,141.00/ 12,158/ 12 » *0.37
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Attachment 3
UTAH LIFELINE COSTS AND REVENUES
CALCULATIONS
Beehive
300 eligables)
Parti ci pati ng Customers (507. of
New Hookups
New Exisitng Customers
Residence Lines
Nonlifeline Lines
Historical
Business Lines
Current Rate
Lifeline Rate
Nonrecurring Rate
Cost Study
Nonrecurring Cost
Conversion Cost

*15.50
* 9.45
S43.00
*53.08
* 6.00

1. Revenue loss from participating lifeline customers
(current rate x participation x 12)
(*

27,900.00)

150 est
38
112
400
150

Revenue gain from participating lifeline customers
(lifeline rate x participation x 12)

3.
4.

21,312.00

Nonrecurring Cost
(cost x new hookups)

(

Coversion Cost
(cost x new exisi ting)

<

2,014.00)
900.00)

Nonrecurring revenues
(1/2 rate x new hookups)

874.00

Administrative Costs
a) printing of notification letters
b) business reply postage on
questionnare
c) publicity ( customer notification)
d) other
Total

TOTAL COSTS DUE TO LIFELINE
807. of Total
surcharge

(S

7,622.00)
7,622.00/

300.00
600.00
(

(*

900.00)
9,528.00)

200/12 • *3. 18

* *15.50 is the filed rates for emergency relief.
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ATTACHMENT 4
TOLL & ACCESS SERVICES SURCHARGE

TOTAL

Intrastate Toll WATS and Access Revenues

$72,346,725

Lifeline Cost to be Covered by the Toll Surcharge
Mountain Bell Costs
Continental Costs
Beehive Costs

$369,175
13,536
1,186

Costs Not Covered
Continental
Beehive

27,876
7,190

Social Services
P.S.C. AdministrateLon

30,000
25,000

Total Cost
Toll, WATS and Access Surcharge
Weighted Amounts
MTS & WATS
Access

$473,963
473,963/72,346,725 = .0066
Individual Service Surcharge

.9987 X .0066 • .0065
2.849 X .0066 - .0188
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tachment 5
UTAH LIFELINE COSTS AND REVENUES
CALCULATIONS
Company Name
rticipating Customers
w Hookups
w Exisitng Customers
sidence Lines
nlifeline Lines
siness Lines
Historical
rrent Rate
feline Rate
>nrecurring Rate
>nrecurring Cost
Cost Study
inversion Cost
Revenue loss from participating lifeline customers
(current rate x participation x 12)
Revenue gain from participating lifeline customers
(lifeline rate x participation x 12)
Nonrecurring Cost
(cost x new hookups)
Coversion Cost
(cost x new exisiting)
Nonrecurring revenues
(1/2 rate x new hookups)
Administrative Costs
a) printing of notification letters
b) business reply postage on
questionnare
c) publicity ( customer notification)
d) other
Total

(

OTAL COSTS DUE TO LIFELINE
107. of T o t a l
surcharge

80% t o a t l

cost/nonlifeline

lines/

12 « $ 0 . 0 0

>

EXHIBIT B

4-,
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -

In the Matter of the Rulemaking
for the Establishment of Telephone Lifeline Rates for All
Regulated Local Exchange Carriers in the State of Utah

CASE NO. 85-999-13
REPORT AND ORDER

ISSUED:

December 17, 1986

Appearances:
Ted Smith

For

Mountain Bell

John W. Horsley

•

Continental Telephone
Company

James J. Cassity

"

Utah Independent
Telephone Association

Gary B. Witt

"

AT&T Communication

Brian W. Burnett,
Assistant Attorney
General

•

Division of Public
Utilities, Department of
Business Regulation,
State of Utah

Bernard M. Tanner,
Assistant Attorney
General

•

Committee of Consumer
Services
Salt Lake Community
Action Program and Utah
Issues

Bruce Plenk

By the Commission:
On
instituting

June

20,

rulemaking

1985,

the

proceedings

telephone lifeline rates.

Commission
for

the

issued

establishment

on

June

of

(the "Division") memorandum

received by the Commission on April 29, 1985.
that

order

Rulemaking was instituted in response

to a Division of Public Utilities

indicated

an

lf

1985

the

Federal

The memorandum
Communication

*% r\ r\

F\

M

CASE NO, 85-999-13
- 2 Commission (the "FCC") would impose a one dollar ($1.00) charge
upon all residential customer access lines.

The charge was to be

increased to two dollars ($2.00) on June 1, 1986.
The memorandum further stated that the FCC had adopted
by its order of December 27, 1985 the Federal-State Joint Board's
recommendation that the FCC implement federal lifeline assistance
measures to assist low-income households in securing telephone
service.

The order provides for a waiver of the federal residen-

tial customer access charge upon condition that the state adopt a
qualifying plan for local lifeline assistance.

To qualify the

local plan must satisfy the following criteria:
1. The End User Common Line Charge (also
referred to as the subscriber line charge or
CALC) for residential subscribers shall be
reduced to the extent the state assistance
equals or exceeds the residential End User
Common Line Charge.
2. In order to qualify for this waiver, the
subscriber must be eligible for and receive
assistance or benefits provided pursuant to a
narrowly targeted state lifeline assistance
plan requiring verification of eligibility,
implemented by the state or the local telephone company.
3.
The state assistance shall include
reduced rates for local telephone service,
service connection charges and customer
deposits, except that benefits or assistance
for connection charges and deposit requirements may only be counted once annually.
Such benefits must be for a single telephone
line, the household's principal residence.
The Division's memorandum further states:
"...that the House and Senate sponsors of
federal legislation which mandate state
lifeline service have delayed action on their
bills until after they have evaluated the

CASE NO. 85-999-13
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before

responsiveness of the FCC and
missions to their concerns."

State

On July

conference was held

the

2, 1985, a prehearing

Commission.

At

the

conference,

Com-

several

parties

suggested issues to be discussed in the evidentiary portion of
the proceeding, and the schedule was established for filing of
legal briefs, testimony and a date for hearing.
On September 5, 1985, the Commission issued a Prehearing Order and Notice of Hearing.

In that Order, the Commission

asked that the parties address several issues, one of which was
whether or not the Commission had authority to establish lifeline
rates.

The

Commission

further

ordered

hearings

to be

held

December 16, 1985.
The Commission heard arguments on the issue of the
Commission's
1985.

authority

to set lifeline rates on December 16,

All parties agreed that the Commission was vested with

sufficient authority to order a lifeline telephone service rate.
Based upon the legal arguments of the parties, the
Commission issued a declaratory order on January 3, 1986, which
concluded

that

the

Commission

had

authority

to

construct

a

lifeline telephone service for low-income subscribers.
On February 18, 1986, the Commission held hearings on
the design of rates and the classification of the ratepayer who
would qualify to obtain the lower "lifeline" rate.

Testimony was

presented by the parties, as well as by public witnesses on
Public Witness Day, February 20, 1986.
were as follows:

The parties' witnesses

CASE NO. 85-999-13
- 4 The Division of Public Utilities presented testimony
through

Cary

B.

through

Orville

Hinton.
K.

Mountain

Unruh.

Bell

Theodore

presented

testimony

Carrier

presented

J.

testimony for Continental Telephone Company, Perry A. Arana and
Raymond A. Hendershot were witnesses for the Utah Independent
Telephone Association.
Communications.
Community

Action

Diane Roth presented testimony for AT&T

Joe Duke-Rosati was the witness for Salt Lake
Program.

R. Phil Bullock

and Timothy

Funk

testified for the Committee of Consumer Services.
Based

upon

the

testimony

and

documentary

evidence

adduced in this matter, the Commission will make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Nationally, the telephone penetration rate is about

90.3 percent

(90.3%) for all classes of customers.

income persons
eligibility

(who are defined

by

reference

to

for public welfare assistance programs) the pene-

tration rate is 72 percent
percent

hereinafter

For low-

(20%).

(72%) , a differential of almost 20

In the Mountain Bell service area and in Utah

specifically, the overall subscriber rate for telephone service
is approximately
households

ninety-five percent

the rate

is

about

(95%).

20 percent

Among
(20%)

low-income

less.

Among

apartment dwellers in Mountain Bell's service area, 71 percent
(71%) of those who have terminated telephone service report that
they could no longer afford the service and as of April, 1984,
only 63.2 percent (63.2%) of participants in the Aid to Families
with Dependent Children had telephone service.

CASE NO. 85-999-13
- 5 2.

Beyond

that,

it

appears

that

future

customer

drop-off will be significant among low-income subscribers, since
low-income households have fewer discretionary funds and are at
greater risk of losing phone service as basic telephone rates
increase.
3.

The Commission has long supported the policy of

universal service, by which is meant the offering of affordable
telephone service to as many of the citizens of the State as
possible.

This policy is likewise endorsed and supported by the

Congress and the Federal Communications Commission.
4.

Universal service offers substantial benefits to

all customers.

The promotion of universal service means more

subscribers in the telephone network and greater communications
access to all.

Greater access enhances* business and quality of

life.

access

Greater

results

in

greater

efficiency

in the

delivery of state social services programs and, thus, better use
of tax dollars.

Maintaining subscribers in the network avoids

the stranding of capital facilities.
5.

A lifeline rate will promote universal service and,

thereby, be in the best interests of all telephone customers in
the State, both local and toll.

We conclude that there are sound

economic reasons for establishing a distinct class of low-income
residence customers with a lower service rate level than the
remaining body of residence customers.
6.

In its rules, the Commission requires that tele-

phone companies, whose basic service rates exceed

the amount

nnnfid?

CASE NO. 85-999-13
- 6 allocated for telephone service in the Standard Needs Budget set
by the State Legislature for the Department of Social Service,
establish a lifeline telephone service.
the Standard

Needs Budget

session was $9.45.

The amount allocated in

at the end of the

last

legislative

Under the lifeline rules, the recipient of a

lifeline rate must pay the funded portion of the Standard Needs
Budget plus Extended Area Services

(EAS) charges.

We conclude

that such an approach is fair and reasonable in that it ties the
amount of rate relief given to lifeline recipients to an objective figure developed by the State Legislature and assures that
lifeline recipients will not receive more in support for telephone

service

through

lifeline

rates

and

the

Standard

Needs

Budget than the rate for service.

eligible

7.

The rules provide that any person who is currently

for

one

or

more

of

the

following

state

assistance

programs shall be eligible for the lifeline rate:
(a)

Aid to Families with Dependent Children;

(b)

Emergency Work Program;

(c)

Pood Stamps;

(d)

General Assistance;

(e)

Home Energy Assistance Target Program;

(f)

Medical Assistance;

(g)

Refugee Assistance; or

(h)

Supplemental Security Income

8.

The foregoing programs provide a reasonable basis

for identifying those person in the state who, because of their

CASE NO. 85-999-13
- 7 income limitations, do not have telephone service or who may be
compelled

to disconnect

basic service increase*

their telephone

service as rates for

Tying lifeline service to these programs

recognizes and adopts the Legislature's conclusions about which
persons are most in need of public assistance.

By adopting these

programs as eligibility criteria, we also ensure that existing
mechanisms

for

determining

mechanisms

provide

a

eligibility

reasonable

and

are

utilized,

cost-effective

which

means

verifying continued eligibility for lifeline service.

of

On bal-

ance , our finding that these categories are fair and reasonable
takes

advantage

of

prior

legislative

findings

that

program

recipients are truly in need of assistance while at the same time
facilitating reasonable qualifications and verification procedures.
9.

We conclude that the rules for Lifeline Telephone

Service will address the needs of the low-income residential
subscribers•
10.
pertaining

The Commission has the authority to adopt rules

to lifeline

telephone

service pursuant

54-4-1, 54-4-4(2) , 54-4-7 and particularly

to Section

54-3-1, Utah Code.

The latter section reads in pertinent part:
"The scope of definition "just and reasonable" may include, but shall not be limited
to, the cost of providing service to each
category of customer, economic impact of
charges on each category of customer, and on
the well-being of the State of Utah;" (emphasis added)

CASE NO. 85-999-13
- 8 About Section 54-3-1, Utah Code, as cited above, the
Supreme Court in Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Utah Public
Service Commission, 636 P.2d 1047 (Utah 1981), stated:
"The 1977 amendments to Section 54-3-1, by
permitting consideration of the economic
impact of a rate on each category of customers, gave legislative approval, in the form
of binding law, to considerations which may
relate, directly or indirectly, to "social
problems." (emphasis added)
It is evident that the Court has concluded that the
Commission has authority to enact a lifeline telephone rate to
meet the needs of a distinct class of low-income residential
customers under existing law.
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That:
1.

The rules for Lifeline Telephone Service heretofore

adopted and made effective December 1, 1986 as filed with the
State

Archivist,

are

hereby

affirmed

and

implemented

to be

effective January 1, 1987,
2.

The companion order issued this date in this same

docket by which the Commission has adopted a stipulation of the
parties on the issues of the operation of the lifeline pool and
the amount of the surcharges for lifeline telephone service in
the State of Utah is hereby affirmed and implemented to take
effect January 1, 1987.

A A A A T A
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- 9 DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 17th day of December, 1986.
Brpcan T.) St^frartl Chairman

1
Brent H. Cameron, commissioner

4&*«.^, ^

Aft? u, ^

Jaafes M. Byrne, Commissioner
Atte

Stfepherf C, Hewlett
Commission Secretary
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- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -

In the Hatter of the Rulemaking
of the Establishment of Telephone Lifeline Rates for All
Regulated Local Exchange Carriers in the State of Utah

CASE NO. 85-999-13
DECLARATORY ORDER

ISSUED:

January 3, 1986

By the Commission:
On June 20. 1985. the Commission issued an Order
instituting

rulemaking proceedings for the establishment

of telephone lifeline rates.
On July

2. 1985, a pre-hearing

held before the Commission.
parties

suggested

evidentiary

portion

issues
of

conference was

At the Conference, several
to

be

discussed

the proceeding.

in

the

In addition, a

schedule was established for the filing of legal briefs,
testimony and a date for hearings.
On September

5. 1985. the Commission

prehearing order and notice of hearing.
Commission

requested

the

parties

to

issued a

In that order the
address

several

issues, one of which concerned the Commission's authority
to

establish

lifeline

rates.

The

Commission

further

ordered hearings to be held the week of December 16. 1985.
On December 4, 1985, the Commission ordered that

nnr>4fi9
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-2argument concerning our authority to set lifeline rates be
held on December 16, 1985 and set February 18, 1986 for
hearing on design of rates.
The Division of Public Utilities on October 17,
1985, filed its brief.

The Division stated in its brief

that although the Utah Supreme Court disallowed a lifeline
rate

based

justified

upon

age,

an

income

classification

can be

if there is a rational connection between the

rate class and statutory criteria for just and reasonable
rates.

In Mountain States Legal Foundation 636 P2d 104

(1981), the Utah Supreme Court held that a senior citizen
lifeline rate was unlawful because there were inadequate
findings

of

Commission.

fact

to

support

the

findings

of

the

The Division stated that although the court

has disallowed

lifeline rates for senior citizens based

upon income alone, it has allowed for lifeline rates if:
(1)

there

evidence,

is

a

between

rational
the

connection,

rate

class

based

upon

the

characteristics

and

statutory criteria for just and reasonable rates and (2)
there is not an unreasonable price differential between
rates

charged

different

qualifying under
just

and

rate

classifications.

A

rate

these tests is not discriminatory, but

reasonable.

The Division

concluded

that

the

CASE NO. 85-999-13
-3Commission

may

order

an

economy

or

lifeline

telephone

service rate within just and reasonable rate parameters.
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph (Mountain
Bell) filed its brief with the Commission on October 11,
1985.

In its brief. Mountain Bell argued that the Utah

Supreme Court has not precluded
the

court

has made

it clear

lifeline rates and that

that

special

rates for a

specific class or category of customers may be perfectly
legal if adequate findings are made by the Commission.
Continental
(Continental)

Telephone

filed

October 11. 1985.

its

brief

Company
with

of

the

the

West

Commission

on

It is Continental's position that the

Commission has authority to establish and fund a lifeline
rate

if

its action

is supported

by valid

findings and

conclusions.
The Utah Independent Telephone Companies

(UITC)

filed its brief with the Commission on October 10. 1985.
UITC concluded, based upon the Mountain States decision,
that

the

Commission

has

the

authority

to

establish

services and rates based upon social considerations such
as

age

and

Commission's

income
ultimate

but

that

decision

the
will

legality
have

to

of

the

rest

on

well-articulated findings of fact on all material issues.

CASE NO. 85-999-13
-4On December

16.1985, the Commission

heard

oral

argument on the legal issues and ruled from the bench that
the Commission

to establish a "lifeline11

has authority

rate.
CONCLUSIONS
The Commission
analysis

provided

Court's

reasoning

by

concludes, based

the parties

in Mountain

and

States

upon the legal

the Utah
Legal

Supreme

Foundation,

that it has the authority to establish a lover rate to
provide

M

lifeline"

service

to

a

distinct

group

of

ratepayers.
The Commission also concludes that it may do so
if a rational connection is established between rate class
characteristics

and

statutory

criteria

for

just

and

reasonable rates. Findings of fact to support a rational
basis for such a classification shall be established in
subsequent proceedings.
ORDER
NOW. THEREFORE. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the
bench order issued December 16. 1985. that the Commission
has

authority

to

establish

"lifeline" service is affirmed.

a

lower

rate

to

provide

CASE NO. 85-999-13

-5DATED at Salt Lake City. Utah, this 3rd day of
January. 1986.

Brent H. Cameron. Chairman

Jaiep M„ Byrne. Commissioner

Brym T.) Stpwarti Commissioner

Attest

^iJ^^dj/-

~)

Georgia B. Peterson
Executive Secretary

